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Abstract 
 
Company-taxation policies in the Central and East European New Member States 
(CEE-NMS) have been frequently characterised as tax-cutting strategies in order to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). On the basis of a survey of six empirical 
studies a median value of the tax-rate elasticities of FDI of -0.22 in CEE-NMS and 
mediterranean periphery countries is derived. Yet, these tax-rate elasticities  probably 
suffer from a sort of measurement error bias since these studies entirely rely on the 
host country Statutory tax rate as measure of tax burden. Building on a thorough 
criticism of FDI as a measure reflecting multinational activity and the Statutory tax 
rate as a reliable measure of the effective tax burden, 315 effective average bilateral 
tax rates (BEATR) are calculated for seven home countries and five CEE-NMS for 
the period 1996-2004, following the approach of Devereux and Griffith (1998). Since 
our empirical results show substantial differences in the variability of the host country 
Statutory tax rates and the BEATRs, it is contended that the latter should be used as 
explanatory variables in empirical studies.  
 
JEL: F2, H00, H25, H77 
Keywords: Corporate income taxation; Effective tax rate; Foreign Direct Investment; 
Multinational Enterprises. 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Recent company-taxation policies in the Central and East European New Member 
States  (CEE-NMS) have been frequently characterised as tax-cutt ing strategies in 
order to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI; Dobrinsky, 2003; Jarass and 
Obermair, 2000). Such policies are usually based on predictions that the tax burden 
levied upon corporate profits will have a substantial influence on investment and 
location decisions of Multinational Companies (MNCs) in the CEE-NMS. So far only 
few studies deal with this topic  and a regional focus of CEE-NMS empirically. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that these studies use invalid indicators of the 
corporate tax burden of the parent company levied upon the profits of its affiliates 
abroad.2 If this is true, the results of these studies do not provide reliable evidence on 
whether variations in the tax burden in the CEE-NMS are an appropriate measure to 
attract FDI.  
                                              
2 “Tax burden” and “FDI” are used for short. 
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It remains an empirical question whether there is a correlation between the tax 
burden and FDI in the CEE-NMS. This question is usually answered via estimation of 
“tax-rate elasticities ”3, which in order to lead to reliable results must fulfil several pre-
requisites. These include adequate measures of MNC activity and a valid indicator of 
the tax burden levied on FDI in a host country as well as a theoretical framework on 
which the choice of explanatory variables included in an econometric specification 
rests. 
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the choice of appropriate FDI data and 
the choice of an appropriate measure of the tax burden levied upon FDI in studies 
estimating the determinants of the location choice of MNCs. The paper is structured 
as follows. First, the results of earlier studies on the value of econometrically 
estimated tax-rate elasticities are briefly reviewed, thereby separating evidence on 
CEE-NMS and “periphery countries” from evidence on “core countries”. Second, it is 
discussed which indicators of tax burden should be used as well as disadvantages of 
using FDI-flow data as an indicator of MNC activity. Third, a description and an 
empirical analysis of the theoretical measures of the tax burden is provided, which 
are thought to be a reliable indicator for the tax burden levied upon FDI of seven 
home countries in the CEE-NMS (i.e., Slovenia (SI), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), 
Czech Republic (CZ) and the Slovak Republic (SK)). These host countries have been 
selected, since they became members of the EU recently and thus, their tax policies 
may provoke (and partly have already provoked) reactions by incumbent EU member 
states even more directly than in the past. The seven home countries are at average 
the largest investors in these countries, ranked by their shares of FDI stocks .4  
 
2 Survey of empirical studies: Does tax policy work to 
attract FDI? 
 
The paper focuses on tax-rate elasticities  explicitly or implicitly provided by several 
empirical studies . The studies are grouped into those which deal with FDI flowing 
mainly within the group of developed or “core” countries (homogenous group) and 
                                              
3 These are defined as the percentage change in FDI following a percentage point change in some 
measure of the tax burden. (DeMooij and Ederveen 2001;Appendix). 
4 On average these countries are among the most important investors in all of the host countries  
considered. Other countries like Switzerland and Belgium are  important for single host countries, only 
(see OECD 2004 and Bank of Slovenia for Details). 
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those which exclusively analyse FDI originating in developed countries and directed 
to countries with a relatively lower level of development, like the CEE-NMS and 
periphery countries  (heterogeneous group). The separation of these two country 
groups is based on the idea that motives for FDI directed into the two groups of 
countries may differ, FDI could react differently to changes in the tax rate, since tax 
costs are part of total production costs. Thus, if cost and efficiency-related motives 
are predominant, FDI in “core -periphery” pairs of countries should be rather 
responsive to changes in tax rates. Since empirical results suggest a dominance of 
market-related motives for FDI in both country groups and thus a low share of purely 
efficiency-related FDI, we do not expect significant differences in tax-rate elasticities. 
However, apart from the motivation, there are a number of other determining factors, 
which might lead to differences in tax-rate elasticities between these country groups, 
which are now discussed.5 
 
2.1 FDI within core countries (“homogenous group”)  
Concerning homogenous countries we rely upon the detailed meta-analysis of 25 
empirical studies carried out by DeMooij and Ederveen (2001, 2003). Their findings 
suggest a median value of the tax-rate elasticity -3.3 (excluding extreme values).6 
That is , a 1 percentage point reduction in the host-country tax rate raises FDI in that 
country by 3.3 percent. In order to compare different empirical studies, the reported 
results have been standardized (see section 2.3. below for the various definitions of 
elasticities and how they are inter-related). The authors note, however, a large 
variability by type of FDI, by source of finance, by sector, by year etc. A result, which 
is of particular relevance for our study is, that “FDI seems more responsive to 
effective or average tax rates than to Statutory tax rates” (ibidem, 2003, p. 690). 
Since the publication of DeMooij’s and Ederveen’s paper, several important studies, 
which are listed in column three of table 1 (see below), have been published. Since 
our focus here is on CEE-NMS, these studies are not reviewed here in greater detail. 
 
                                              
5 We do not consider methodological factors here. 
6 An extreme value is defined as a value which lies more than 2 standard deviations from the mean 
value (DeMooij and Ederveen 2001).  
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2.2 FDI from core to periphery countries (“heterogeneous group”) 
Empirical evidence for CEE-NMS is still very limited, which is partly due to a lack of 
data and which stands in contrast to public debates, both in incumbent EU member 
states and CEE-NMS. For a number of reasons, listed below, CEE-NMS differ from 
other OECD countries or incumbent EU countries  and it will be argued that these 
differences  may be conducive to the fact that CEE-NMS are more likely to use 
company taxation as an instrument to attract foreign investment: 
 
§ The share of efficiency FDI 
Following a number of surveys (Lankes and Venables, 1996; Altzinger, 1998 on 
Austrian FDI; Lankes and Wes, 2001; for an overview see Szanyi, 1999) on the 
motives for manufacturing FDI in the CEE-NMS foreign investment enterp rises 
grosso modo can be separated into re-export-oriented and market-oriented 
companies. According to this division the most important motives for FDI were low 
production costs in the CEE-NMS on the one hand and gaining market access (to the 
host market or to the CEE-NMS region in total) on the other hand. Up to 1996, these 
surveys indicate that approximately two thirds to three fourth of manufacturing FDI 
have been market-oriented. Given that returns for host-market related FDI will 
diminish the more non-export-oriented companies are established in the CEE-NMS it 
appears likely that the share of efficiency-oriented FDI in terms of enterprises will rise 
in the future. Since taxes directly impact on the costs of production, it is conceivable 
that efficiency-oriented FDI are more responsive to tax changes than market-oriented 
FDI. Consequently, the probability that CEE-NMS countries inter alia use corporate 
taxation as an instrument to attract FDI will also increase. 
 
§ The share of greenfield FDI in total FDI 
There are two main channels of FDI in the CEE-NMS; either through mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) of existing firms (including privatization) or through establishing a 
new firm (greenfield investment). According to Lankes and Wes (1999) the proportion 
of greenfield FDI to M&A is approximately 50 percent if the number of manufacturing 
investment projects is considered. Yet, the proportion of greenfield FDI to total FDI is 
considerably lower in terms of the actual amount of FDI or in employment terms – 
approximately 25 to 33 percent according to several authors (Lankes and Wes, 2001, 
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Antalóczy and Sass, 2001, Zemplinerová and Jarolím, 2001).7 Greenfield FDI is  
expected to be more responsive to tax rate changes than acquisitions, where the 
location of the target object is given. Since, a major part of M&As in the CEE-NMS 
was due to privatization and the number of privatization objects decreases over time, 
the proportion of greenfield FDI will increase. Because greenfield FDI are expected to 
be more responsive to tax rate changes than acquisitions, this will raise the 
importance of corporate taxation as a location factor.  
 
§ Maturity of FDI  
The profitability of affiliates in CEE-NMS is related to their age. For example, 
Dell’mour (2003) reports for Austrian FDI in the CEE-NMS that “the profitability of 
affiliates which existed for five or more years is significantly higher (7.3% median 
value) than for younger affiliates (2.7%)” (translated by authors; see also Altzinger 
2003). Since FDI in today’s CEE-NMS generally were not possible before 1989, the 
foreign affiliates are mostly young firms. The increase of the profitability over time 
might lead to a change in the financing of the affiliate abroad. The parent company 
might increasingly rely on reinvested profits rather than on own capital transfers and 
thus through the interaction of home and host country legislation, taxation becomes a 
more prominent location factor. 
 
§ Small-country property 
With respect to tax policy, the probability that small countries engage in tax 
competition is higher than for larger countries. This argument is based upon 
theoretical considerations by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and Wilson (1999), who 
find that small countries engaging in tax competition might receive net welfare gains  
from lowering taxes. Related to this  Krogstrup (2003) argues  that larger countries are 
less sensitive to tax competition as their agglomeration advantages allow them to set 
higher taxes than smaller countries. These arguments suggest that the CEE-NMS 
might find it beneficial to lower their tax rates further, since with the exception of 
Poland the CEE-NMS are small to medium-sized countries . 
                                              
7 It should be mentioned, however, that the distinction between greenfield FDI and M&A is somewhat 
artificial, as the latter do not differ from the former in many cases, if the acquired firm has been totally 
restructured. Please note that the relevance of this distinction for the location choice remains 
unaffected. 
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§ Strong preference of CEE-NMS for FDI 
With the start of transition the inflow of FDI was considered to be one of the main 
vehicles to accelerate economic development in the CEE-NMS. Besides 
compensating for the lack of domestic investment, the role of FDI was to facilitate 
restructuring via transferring technology and know-how, removing inefficiencies etc. 
Though the restructuring aspects might have lost importance over the years, the 
possibility that FDI generate employment and growth still induces a high preference 
for foreign capital in CEE-NMS. This might have become even more important, 
through the recent EU-accession, because of a facilitated access to the Common 
Market and an induced growth of political stability. The high preference for FDI 
makes CEE-NMS’ governments especially prone to tax cuts as a means to attract 
FDI. 
A priori we therefore expect tax-rate elasticities  to be larger in absolute value in CEE-
NMS compared to those of OECD countries. Yet, there also exist several arguments 
against the existence of a close correlation between taxes and FDI (based on 
Büttner, 2001). Since the mobility of firms is limited, few re -locations or shifts of 
profits to low tax countries should occur in the short term due to tax (rate) changes. 
Therefore, quick success of tax-lowering strategies is not to be expected. A 
(debated) indication is the fact that despite generally lower tax rates, corporate tax 
income as percentage of GDP has risen in European countries on average. Building 
on the meta-analysis by deMooij and Ederveen (2003) reported above, we add and 
review the following papers8 (cf. Table 1 , col. 1 and 2): 
Table 1 Recent Studies on Taxation and FDI, by country group 
Eastern Europe Periphery Countries Core countries 
Alfano (2004) Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1994) 
Beaulieu, McKenzie and 
Wen (2004)  
Beyer (2002a)  Benassy-Quere, Fontange 
and Lahreche-Revil (2003) 
Carstensen and Toubal (2004)  Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)  
Edmiston, Mudd and Valev 
(2003)  
Hansson and Olafsdotter 
(2004)  
Javorcik (2004)   
Note: “Recent” studies are defined in terms of either having been published after deMooij and 
Ederveen (2003) or have not been included in that study. 
                                              
8 Here, only the results for the CEE-NMS and periphery countries are reported. 
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This requires the standardization of three different types of elasticities reported in 
empirical studies (see deMooij and Ederveen 2001, Appendix) : 
t
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K … measure of foreign capital 
t … tax on K in the foreign country 
 
As some of the studies mentioned in Table 1, cols. 1 and 2 used a specification in 
levels, the following transformation was made: 
 
taxbaK *+=   
 
The b-coefficient was transformed into a semi-elasticity by Kb /)*100(  where K was 
evaluated at its sample mean value, which is either directly provided in the studies or 
is derived from the information provided there. 
On the basis of these six empirical studies9 a tax-rate elasticity of -0.22 (median 
value, semi-elasticity)  was derived. Clearly, this  tax-rate elasticity w.r.t. FDI is smaller 
in absolute terms in CEE-NMS than in the core countries, reported in subsection 3.1, 
which does not meet our expectations. However, these results are questioned for 
several reasons:  
                                              
9 Several other studies on location choice of MNCs in CEE-NMS (see, e.g. Janicky and Wunnava, 
2004) and on taxation in CEE-NMS have been published recently (see, e.g. Dobrinsky, 2003), yet 
these studies do not combine the aspects of taxation and FDI, which is a serious shortcoming, if 
location choice is to be explained. 
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§ methodological shortcomings  of the surveyed studies, especially an omitted 
variable bias as only few studies base their choice of right-hand side variables 
explicitly on economic theory (notably Carstensen and Toubal, 2004)10  
§ the definition of MNC activity as a capital flow (i.e. FDI flow) and  
§ the lack of a suitable measure of the tax burden. 
In this paper we concentrate on the last two issues in section 2.3.  
 
2.3 Some critical points 
This section discusses three features which are of particular importance in deriving 
tax-rate elasticities: first, how to measure company tax burden appropriately (2.3 .1.), 
second, how to measure MNC activity (2.3.2.) and third, to what extent these two 
points are interrelated (2.3.2). 
 
2.3.1 The measurement of company tax burden as a determ inant of the location 
choice of MNCs  
Which measures of tax burden should be used in empirical analysis as a determinant 
of location decisions of MNCs? In order to answer this question, it is split into two 
sub-questions: 
 
(i) Which measures of tax burden are available in general? 
Apart from the Statutory tax rates, the measures of tax burden may be split into 
backward-looking and forward -looking tax rates (cf. Figure 1 and the references 
mentioned there). While both have advantages and disadvantages, clearly the choice 
of the measure of tax burden should be guided by the underlying research question, 
in our case the choice of a foreign location by an MNC. On the one hand, backward-
looking tax rates are inappropriate, since profits from national and international 
activities cannot be disentangled and backward-looking rates can be seriously flawed 
due to data problems. Notably, National Accounts Data do not provide reliable data 
                                              
10 Other methodological shortcomings in one or more of these studies include: static panel data 
models instead of dynamic models (again, omitted variable bias) and endogenity between the 
endogenous variable and the measure of tax burden used (simultaneity bias). 
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on corporate profits. Advantages of backward-looking tax rates are that there are 
easily calculated from real data and include tax planning activities of MNCs.  
On the other hand, forward-looking effective tax rates (ETRs) focus on hypothetical 
(“future”) investments and inter alia  carry three conceptual advantages, which are of 
relevance for location decisions: (i) They distinguish between domestic and 
international investments (domestic vs. bilateral rates). (ii) They are calculated as 
either effective average tax rates (EATRs), measuring the tax burden of an infra-
marginal (i.e. profi table) investment or as effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs), 
measuring the tax burden of an investment which just covers the cost of capital. (iii) 
They reflect the location decision of an MNC, which is, of course, also “forward-
looking”. Disadvantages are the relatively high degree of complexity in the calculation 
of these rates – the net present value of a hypothetical investment has to be 
calculated with and without taxation – and the fact that tax planning activities of 
MNCs cannot be addressed with those rates.11 
 
Figure 1  Measures of tax burden 
 
 
                                              
11 For a detailed description of advantages and disadvantages of these rates consult inter alia OECD 
(2000) or Leibrecht and Römisch (2002). 
Effective Tax Rates 
Statutory tax rates 
Tax  quotas  
Forward-looking (“hypothetical, 
tax law based”) effective tax 
rates (domestic and bilateral 
rates) 
Backward-looking (“observable 
from real data”) effective tax 
rates  
Effective marginal tax rates  
King/Fullerton 1984 
OECD 1991 
Devereux/Griffiths 1998 
Effective average tax rates  
Devereux/Griffiths 1998 
Jacobs/Spengel 2002 
Average effective tax rates  
National-Accounts Data & OECD 
Revenue Statistics: 
Mendoza et al. 1994; Leibrecht 
and Römisch 2002. 
Firm-level Data: Nicodeme 2001; 
Volkerink and De Haan 2001. 
Marginal effective tax rates 
Tax Revenue Data:  
Gordon et al. 2003 
Tax to GDP 
Tax to Total Tax Revenue  
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(ii) Which measures of tax burden are appropriate, if location decisions are to be 
explained? 
In order to answer the second question, we start from a description of the location 
decision by an MNC, following Devereux and Griffith (2003; 2002; and 1998). 
According to Devereux and Griffith as well as the established literature on MNCs, the 
location decision should be split into three levels: 
§ “Level 1” is concerned with the discrimination between different types of 
market servicing, most importantly whether to produce at home or abroad.12  
§ “Level 2” includes the decision where to locate, given that level 1 resulted in 
the decision to invest abroad (i.e. FDI). Level 2 thus comprises discrete 
investment decisions (all-or-nothing, Mutti and Grubert, 2004, p. 342). 
§ “Level 3”: Either when entering a new market or when production is already in 
place adjustment decisions are taken, i.e. expansion or downscaling of an 
existing investment abroad. 
 
Figure 2 includes the three different decision levels described related to the location 
choice of an MNC: 
 
Figure 2 Parent Company’s Decision tree for FDI 
 MNC decision Result 
Level 1 Domestic or Abroad FDI 
Level 2 Where? Choice of foreign location 
Level 3 How much? Scale of production abroad 
 
Source: Based on Devereux and Griffith (2002), p. 87 
 
The two forward looking ETRs mentioned under (i) above are now directly related to 
level 2 decisions and level 3 decisions in the following way: EATRs are related to the 
decision where to locate (level 2), ranking the investment according to the profitability 
                                              
12 Here, we are not concerned with the choice between FDI and other types of foreign market 
servicing, since our dependent variable is some measure of FDI or the activity of an MNC in a host 
country. Thus, we take the MNC as given. Needless to mention, the first decision level in Figure 2 
below is explained by the OLI paradigm. 
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in different locations. EMTRs explain the optimal scaling of a new or existing 
investment (level 3), “conditional on the choice of location” (Devereux and Griffith, 
2003, p. 108).  
The conclusions from the foregoing discussion for the analysis of location decision of 
MNCs and taxation are: 
§ From a conceptual point of view ETRs are superior to Statutory tax rates as 
indicators of tax burden. 
§ When dealing with FDI ETRs need to be derived on a bilateral level with 
respect to international location decisions. 
§ For an analys is of location decisions of MNCs BEATRs are suggested. 
§ EATRs and EMTRs should be used in empirical studies, if the dependent 
variable is a measure of aggregate FDI flows.  
The last conclusion merits a short explanation: Ideally, one would need data on “level 
2” decisions and on “level 3” decisions. However, in most cases only aggregate  FDI 
data (see subsection 2.3.2. below) are available. These data typically do not allow a 
separation of FDI into new FDI and expansionary  FDI.13 Therefore, aggregate FDI 
measures should be related to both, average and marginal tax rates, the former 
explaining new FDI (where to locate) and the latter explaining expansionary FDI (the 
scaling of the investment) (Devereux and Griffith, 1998, p. 344). Yet, virtually all 
studies reviewed above, use only one single measure of tax burden, despite the fact 
that almost all of these studies use aggregate FDI data. Most studies do not even 
comment on the suitability of the Statutory tax rate or argue that Statutory tax rates 
and average tax rates behave similar empirically (e.g., Javorcik 2004). 
In subsection 3 below it will be shown that using the Statutory tax rate is likely to 
result in biased estimates of tax-rate elasticities . This is simply done by comparing 
the level and variability of BEATRs14 with that of the Statutory tax rates.  
 
                                              
13 From an empirical point of view, this problem of non-separability of certain types of FDI data is 
mitigated by the fact that the semi-elasticities do not differ significantly between studies  separating or 
not these two types of FDI, as mentioned by DeMooij and Ederveen (2001, p. 32). 
14 Since we are concerned with location decisions in this paper, we do not show EMTRs, which we 
have calculated for the same range of countries and period, yet which refer to “level 3” decisions. But 
one should be aware that studies which use aggregate FDI flows or stocks as the dependent variable 
have to use both effective rates as regressors from a conceptual point of view. Otherwise the results 
may suffer from omitted variable bias. 
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2.3.2 The measurement of MNC activity  
Despite there are several official and internationally agreed definitions of FDI, the 
choice of the appropriate indicator in empirical research is a difficult task and no 
commonly agreed FDI-measure exists (e.g. Bellak 1998, 1999). With respect to 
location choice, the quality of FDI flow data has been compared to various other 
measures of multinational activity. Here, the advantages and disadvantages of 
several commonly used measures are discussed briefly. (see Boxes 1 and 2; cf. also 
Devereux and Griffith 2002, p. 84f.)  
Location choices of MNCs have to be operationalised in order to be used as the 
dependent variable in empirical studies. This boils down to the question whether FDI 
data obtained from international databases like UNCTAD, EUROSTAT15 or OECD 
are sufficient to reflect location dec isions (see Box 1) and thus should be correlated 
with tax variables. This question is important, since such data have been used in 
many empirical studies on taxation and FDI for the simple reason of data availability. 
While these measures have the advantage of covering a broad range of countries 
and time, however, a majority of authors in this field emphasizes the necessity to 
measure the real activities of MNCs in the host country, rather than the financial side 
of FDI. These aspects are reflected in the credit (assets) and debit (financing) side of 
the balance sheet of a company as well as in the share of cross-border flows of 
capital in total capital invested in the host country. It is concluded that ideally several 
measures should be used and that FDI capital data should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
Box 1. FDI Measures used in the Literature on Taxation and FDI 
FDI data comprise flow measures as well as stock measures. The latter are either 
built from accumulated flows taken from the annual balance of payments (Eurostat 
2003), in which case the annual differences in stocks (i.e. FDI position data; e.g. 
Gorter and Parikh, 2003, p. 197) equals the flows; or they reflect book-values, in 
which case the annual flows from the balance of payments may be larger or smaller 
than differences in annual stocks. This is due to valuation issues and the share of 
                                              
15 Gorter and Parikh, 2003, p. 197, report that Eurostat constructs end of period positions and adjusts 
this information by correcting for inflation, exchange rate changes as well as for the revaluation of the 
assets and liabilities. An end of period position should thus represent the market value of the capital 
stock at current prices at exchange rates. 
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locally raised funds, which are not included in the Balance of Payments definition of 
FDI issued by the IMF manual. 
FDI flows … 
… may reflect only net cross -border capital flows between parent company and 
the subsidiary and thus exclude reinvested earnings (a problem which was 
particularly relevant for several Central- and East European countries during 
the early years of transition). 
… may include reinvested earnings of the affiliate, which, by definition, do not 
cross borders, but constitute an important share of capital invested in many 
cases (Bellak, 1998). For an insightful report, see the Hungarian National 
Bank (2004). 
 
 
FDI stocks  … 
… are ideally measured in book values, originating from company accounts. They 
are closer to measures of real activities than FDI flows as they measure the 
capital stock which by definition in the simplified balance sheet includes real 
and financial assets. FDI stock data suffer, however, from the valuation at 
historical values, which “can be especially misleading when there has been 
significant inflation in some countries but not in others.”(Mutti, 2003) Yet, FDI 
stock data carry the advantage that local borrowing in the host country is 
included. 
Note: For a more detailed discussion and the empirical relevance of the valuation 
problem, see Cantwell and Bellak (1998); and Bellak and Cantwell (2004). 
 
Box 2. Measures thought to reflect real activities of MNCs more appropriately 
Plant, property and equipment (PPE): These are referred to as “fixed assets”. In 
other words, they are a firm’s real estate, buildings, machines, factories etc. and 
consist of physical assets. They are carried in the balance sheet at cost, regardless 
of their actual value, which is the main critique to the use of PPE as reflecting the real 
activities of MNCs. Even if intangible assets are also carried in the balance sheet, 
they should be excluded as measures of real activities, since their valuation is largely 
meaningless. (Rather, the profit and loss account (income statement) gives an insight 
into the “real” value of intangibles.) 
Differently from FDI stocks (see Box 1), which reflect book values of ownership 
claims  of controlling foreign investors (debit side of balance sheet) and thus exclude 
equity supplied by host country investors, PPE reflect book values of real productive 
assets . As Hines (1996b, p. 11) states: “PPE probably more closely corresponds to 
capital that enters production functions.” PPEs thus exclude those components of 
FDI, which are financial investments. The advantage, therefore, is to exclude 
differences in the behaviour of real and financial assets (e.g. degree of volatility), 
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which are well known from studies comparing portfolio investment vs. FDI. However, 
these measures suffer from three disadvantages, related to the valuation of capital 
stock, i.e. exchange rate fluctuations, inflation and the exclusion of intangible assets. 
 
Gross product of affiliates  (GPO): This measure is available almost exclusively for 
the US (although other countries, like Germany, have similar data on sales of 
affiliates). Gross product is derived from financial and operating data. GPO measures 
the value of goods and services produced by MNCs. The measure thus differs from 
“sales”, because sales include the inputs that the company purchases from outsiders 
as well as what it produces itself. Sales therefore have a drawback, since they may 
lead to overestimations of the real activity of MNCs in the host country. On the other 
hand, the drawback of GPO as reported in the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
statistics is that it does not allow inclusion of industry detail or different types of 
affiliate ownership. 
 
Number of affiliates  (NOA): For several countries, the number of newly established 
affiliates annually is available. The use of count data has several methodological 
implications for empirical analysis. The main advantage of this measure is that it 
addresses the issue of firm location more directly than investment flow studies. 
(Beaulieu et al., 2004, p. 7) Also, new foreign firms may also be related to the 
entrepreneurial activity in the host country on the whole. A certain drawback is that 
this measure excludes expansionary investment, yet the question is whether location 
choice for new investments and location choice for expansionary investments can be 
expected to follow the same logic. But the exclusion of expansionary investments 
implies, too, that there is only one measure of tax burden necessary, namely the  
BEATR (see point 2.4.1 (ii)). 
 
The discussion shows that from a conceptual point of view PPE data represent real 
multinational activity best. Due to data restrictions many studies rely upon FDI flows 
or stocks. But also these variables may (partly) not be available for a range of 
countries. One way to overcome the lack of data in this respect is to use mirror 
statistics, i.e. the outward FDI originating in the home country, if outward FDI is 
classified by host countries. But one has to be aware that there exist substantial 
differences between data reported by home and host countries . 
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3 Effective average tax rates in CEE-NMS 
 
In this section it is shown that the critical points raised above are likely to result in 
biased estimates. This is done through a comparison of the variability of the Statutory 
tax rate and that of the conceptually superior ETRs. 
The variability of the tax rates is considered here, because it matters in an 
econometric estimation, rather than the absolute value of the regressor. Our prior is 
that replacing the conceptually appropriate effective tax rates by the Statutory Tax 
rate, which is easily available, is only justified, if the variability in the Statutory tax 
rates is not statistically different from that of the BEATR.  
We calculated forward-looking ETRs based upon the Devereux and Griffith 
methodology as no such data have been available so far concerning the CEE-NMS. 
This amounts to 423 single effective tax rates (domestic and bilateral) for seven 
home and five host countries for the time period 1996 to 2004. 
 
3.1 Assumptions 
Following Devereux and Griffith (1998 and 2003)16 we do not consider personal 
income taxes as for MNCs the majority shareholder17 is not known and/or she may 
not have the majority vote amongst shareholders and, more importantly, because we 
do not believe that for the managers of the MNCs the personal income tax position of 
the shareholders is an important factor for location decisions. We also exclude any 
other fiscal or non-fiscal incentives which might be provided to  MNCs. In line with 
other studies  (e.g. Yoo 2003; Devereux and Griffith 2003), the assumptions  and 
parameters used in our calculation of ETRs are the following: 
 
§ 3 types of assets (machinery, building and inventory in the manufacturing 
sector) 
                                              
16 The model allows deriving effective tax rates for an average firm. Two limitations should be 
emphasized: First, effective tax rates are derived upon a fixed pre-tax profitability (see below) and 
second, profits are assumed to be equal in each location. Despite both limitations are clearly not given 
in praxi , the advantage is to better isolate the effects of changes in effective tax rates (ceteris paribus). 
17 This is the person who determines the return required on each asset. Her personal sphere needs to 
be considered in the calculation of “shareholder -level -EATRs” (see Devereux 2003). 
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§ 3 ways of financing a hypothetical domestic investment of 1 with a pre-tax 
financial return of 20%: retained earnings, new equity and debt 
§ 7 ways of financing a cross border investment of 1 with a pre-tax financial 
return of 20%18: (i) retained earnings subsidiary; (ii) new equity subsidiary and 
retained earnings parent; (iii) debt subsidiary and retained earnings parent; (iv) 
new equity subsidiary and new equity parent; (v) debt subsidiary and debt 
parent; (vi) new equity subsidiary and debt parent; (vii) debt subsidiary and 
new equity parent. 
§ economic depreciation rates of the various assets: 3.61% for buildings, 
12.25% for machinery, 0% for inventory 
§ nominal interest rate of 7.625% 
§ common inflation rate of 2.5% 
§ constant nominal exchange rate 
§ a weighted average structure of assets (buildings / machinery / inventory) of 
55% / 35% / 10% 
§ a weighted average structure across the various types of financing (retained 
earnings / equity / debt): 55 / 10 / 35 for parent and 1/3 / 1/3 / 1/3 for 
subsidiary. 
 
Our assumptions about the asset structure differ from those of other studies, which 
mainly follow OECD (1991), because data on inventories in the CEE-NMS show that 
they are far less important than within the OECD in 1991. In particular, we assign a 
higher weight to investment in buildings.19 
 
3.2 Data description and analysis 
3.2.1 Statutory tax rates and domestic effective average tax rates 
We start from a simple comparison of Statutory tax rates and domestic effective 
average rates (DEATRs). The “overall” Statutory corporate tax rates (that is including 
local and central government profit taxes) reported in table 2 suggest that all host 
                                              
18 In the appendix we show how the bilateral effective tax rates depend on this assumption. 
19 For explanatory notes about other assumptions please consult the respective studies directly. 
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countries but Slovenia face a fall in the overall Statutory corporate tax rate  over the  
period under consideration. In Slovenia  the rate remained constant. With respect to 
the home countries only Germany and Italy see a remarkable fall in the Statutory 
corporate tax rate. These two countries show by far the highest Statutory corporate 
tax rate in 1996. Furthermore, while in 1996 three host countries had higher Statutory 
corporate tax rates than the average rate of 37.6 percent, all of them have below 
average rates (average of 29.6 percent) in 2004. The largest drop occurred in 
Slovakia  and Poland within host countries and Germany within home countries, 
respec tively. No changes in the overall Statutory corporate tax rate occurred in 
Austria, the US and as mentioned in Slovenia. 
 
Table 2 Overall Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 1996 - 2004 
  CZ HU PL SK SI AUT  FR GER NL UK US IT 
Year      %        
1996 39.00  19.00  40.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 36.70 57.40 35.00 33.00 40.00 52.20 
1997 35.00  19.00  36.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 36.70 57.40 35.00 31.00 40.00 53.20 
1998 35.00  19.14  36.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 41.70 56.70 35.00 31.00 40.00 41.30 
1999 35.00  19.40 34.00 40.00 25.00 34.00 40.00 52.30 35.00 31.00 40.00 41.30 
2000 31.00  19.64  30.00 29.00 25.00 34.00 36.60 51.85 35.00 31.00 40.00 41.25 
2001 31.00  19.64  28.00 29.00 25.00 34.00 35.30 38.67 35.00 30.00 40.00 40.25 
2002 31.00  19.64  28.00 25.00 25.00 34.00 34.30 38.67 34.50 30.00 40.00 40.25 
2003 31.00  19.64  27.00 25.00 25.00 34.00 34.30 38.67 34.50 30.00 40.00 38.25 
2004 28.00  17.66  19.00 19.00 25.00 34.00 34.30 36.67 34.50 30.00 40.00 37.25 
 
Turning to DEATRs, that is ETRs which cover the host country tax code (Statutory 
corporate tax rates as well as allowances), one observes a similar development as 
for the overall Statutory corporate tax rate. The DEATR fell in almost all countries. In 
the US there was no change due to a constant overall Statutory corporate tax rate 
and constant allowances. In Austria and Slovenia there was a slight increase due to 
a change in allowances combined with a constant overall Statutory corporate tax 
rate. One may conclude that the development of the DEATR and the overall 
Statutory corporate tax rate are very similar. This is not surprising as the DEATR 
usually is more sensitive to changes in the overall Statutory corporate tax rate than to 
changes in allowances (e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 2002).  
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Table 3 DEATRs 1996 – 2004 (selected years) 
  CZ HU PL SK SI AUT  FR GER NL UK US IT 
Year      %        
2004 24.48  13.56  17.89 16.30 20.49 26.85 26.84 31.08 29.22 24.90 32.92 29.56 
2002 27.11  15.69  26.39 22.88 19.24 26.85 26.84 32.78 29.22 24.90 32.92 31.96 
2000 27.11  15.69  28.28 26.55 19.24 26.38 28.39 41.60 29.65 24.90 32.92 32.76 
1998 32.20  15.29  33.95 36.67 19.24 26.38 32.41 45.56 29.65 25.74 32.92 32.76 
1996 35.89  15.18  37.74 36.92 19.24 26.38 28.47 46.13 29.65 27.43 32.92 41.54 
 
It is important to note that tables 2 and 3 show large differences in the levels of the 
overall Statutory corporate tax rates and the DEATRs. This is explained by the fact 
that the tax base matters for the calculation of a valid indicator of the tax burden 
levied upon corporate profits. The Statutory tax rate may thus be misleading. For 
example, the Statutory corporate tax rate for Germany is above 55 percent in 1996, 
but the DEATR is  below 50 percent. From these two tables a country ranking of the 
level of the tax burden levied upon corporate profits is easily deduced.  
 
Table 4 Country Ranking 1996 and 2004 
 
Statutory Tax Rates 
1996 
Dom. EATR 
1996 
Statutory Tax Rates 
2004 
Dom. EATR 
2004 
Rank      
1 HU HU HU HU 
2 SI SI PL, SK SK 
3 UK AUT  . PL 
4 AUT  UK SI SI 
5 NL FR CZ CZ 
6 FR NL UK UK 
7 CZ US AUT FR 
8 PL, SK, US CZ FR AUT 
9 . SK NL NL 
10 . PL GER IT 
11 IT IT IT GER 
12 GER GER US US 
 
Table 4 shows that despite the level differences , the ranking of countries is almost 
independent of the indicator (Statutory tax rate or DEATR). It also shows that the 
CEE-NMS lowered their tax burden levied upon profits much more than the home 
countries. Especially Slovakia and Poland improved in the ranking between 1996 and 
2004. Furthermore it is evident that the Czech Republic  lost grounds within the CEE-
NMS. To conclude, despite the differences in absolute levels one may well use the 
overall Statutory corporate tax rate if the aim is a simple ranking of countries.  
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Yet, as mentioned before, for an econometric estimation of tax-rate elasticities  the 
variability of the indicator of tax burden is more important than the absolute level of 
the indicator. Therefore , the standard deviations (STD) of the various rates are 
compared (cf. table 5).  
 
 
Table 5 Standard Deviations I (1996 – 2004) 
 
STD Statutory Tax 
Rate STD DEATR 
Country percentage points percentage points 
CZ 3.33 3.61 
HU 0.64 0.66 
PL 6.31 5.97 
SK 8.22 7.94 
SI 0.00 0.55 
 
 
The STDs reveal that the variability in the Statutory overall corporate tax rate and the 
DEATR are similar for most countries.20 Yet, as has been mentioned already the 
DEATR is not the relevant rate for analysing FDI, rather the Statutory tax rate has to 
be compared to the BEATR, which will be described in the following subsection.  
 
 
3.2.2 Statutory tax rates and bilateral effective tax rates  
The crucial point here is that in case of FDI and MNCs one has to consider the 
international tax code (double taxation agreements, supranational agreements as the 
parent-subsidiary directive) and the tax code of the home country (home country 
corporate income tax rate) in addition to the host country tax system. In order to  
answer the question whether Statutory tax rates can be used for estimations of tax-
rate elasticities we now compare its variability to those of the BEATR. Table 6 shows 
the BEATRs for seven home countries (AUT, GER, FR, NL, IT, UK, US) and 
Slovenia. 
 
                                              
20 Testing the null hypothesis of equal variability using the median-version of the Levene-Test (e.g. 
Eckstein 2000) gives p-values (far) above 20 percent for each country. Therefore the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
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Table 6 BEATRs with Slovenia  
  AUT  FR GER IT NL UK US SI (Statutory) 
Year    %      
2004 18.28 19.49  19.66  18.40 18.30 22.79  32.47  25.00  
2003 21.77 22.98  30.28  25.42 21.79 22.79  32.47  25.00  
2002 18.85 20.11  27.69  22.71 18.87 19.92  29.97  25.00  
2001 18.85 20.18  27.69  22.71 18.89 19.92  29.97  25.00  
2000 18.85 20.27  28.63  22.74 18.89 19.92  29.97  25.00  
1999 18.85 20.52  28.67  22.74 18.89 19.92  29.97  25.00  
1998 26.12 20.64  26.92  22.74 18.89 20.93  29.97  25.00  
1997 26.12 20.28  26.95  23.13 18.89 20.93  29.97  25.00  
1996 26.12 20.28  26.95  23.13 18.89 22.94  29.97  25.00  
 
Table 6 shows that the levels of BEATRs are different from the level of the Statutory 
tax rate (25 percent). Also, a substantial drop in almost all bilateral rates  occurred. An 
exception is the BEATR for the US-Slovenia country pair, which increased slightly. 
This increase is due to the constant overall Statutory corporate tax rate in the US and 
in Slovenia compared with constant allowances in the US and a change in 
allowances in Slovenia  (in 2003). The exceptional increase in 2003 and the 
subsequent fall in 2004 are due to a remarkable reduction of allowances in Slovenia 
and the adoption of the parent-subsidiary directive in 2004, which reduces the 
EATRs for countries which apply the exemption method.21 
Concerning other BEATRs not shown here, Slovakia  had the highest BEATR vis-à-
vis all home countries in 1996 (the first year of examination). Hungary (vis-à-vis two) 
and Slovenia (vis-à-vis five) home countries had the lowest BEATRs. In 2004 (the 
last year of examination) the Czech Republic  has the highest BEATR vis-à-vis all 
home countries and again Hungary and Slovenia the lowest. Now Hungary has the 
lowest rate vis -à-vis five and Slovenia vis-à-vis two home countries. Hungary and 
Slovenia  changed ranks . Why Hungary does not have the lowest rate vis-à-vis the 
UK and vis-à-vis the US is explained by the credit system, namely in the case of 
repatriated dividends combined with a relative ly low tax rate (e.g. in Hungary). The 
resulting tax on dividends is therefore much higher in Hungary than in Slovenia . 
A comparison of the average BEATR (across home countries) vis -à-vis each single 
host country for the years 1996 and 2004 shows that in 1996 the host country with 
the lowest average BEATR is Slovenia, followed by Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic  and Slovakia (cf. table 7). The standard deviation (STD) is about 9.4 
                                              
21 For this reason, the development is different in the UK and the US, two countries which apply the 
credit system (see table 6). 
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percentage points (pp) in 1996. Until 2004 the ranking has changed: Hungary is in  
first place, Slovenia in second, Poland remains in third, Slovakia is in fourth and the 
Czech Republic in fifth place. In 2004 the STD is much lower than in 1996, thus the 
CEE-NMS-5 converged substantially in BEATRs. The largest drop in the average 
bilateral rate occurred in Slovakia and Poland. The smallest drop occurred in 
Slovenia , but Slovenia had a relatively low Statutory tax rate and BEATR throughout 
the period 1996–2004. 
Moreover, the ranking within the CEE-NMS is different to the ranking by the Statutory 
tax rate and the DEATR. With respect to the BEATR Hungary is the most tax 
favourable host country and the Czech Republic  is the leas t favourable host country 
in 2004. On a bilateral basis Slovenia is more favourable than Slovakia and Poland in 
1996 and 2004 which is an important difference to the ranking resulting from 
Statutory tax rates or DEATRs. 
 
Table 7 BEATRs 1996 – 2004  
  CZ HU PL SK SI 
Year   %    
2004 27.97  19.76  21.92  22.25  21.34  
2003 33.86  24.52  29.59  30.49  25.36  
2002 33.87  25.00  30.74  31.44  22.59  
2001 33.88  25.02  30.76  34.20  22.60  
2000 34.02  25.17  32.26  34.47  22.75  
1999 36.96  25.05  35.07  43.13  22.79  
1998 38.25  24.82  36.33  42.78  23.74  
1997 38.27  24.76  36.35  43.11  23.75  
1996 41.68  25.02  39.69  43.09  24.04  
       
 STD 2004 3.12 pp  STD 1996 9.37 pp 
      
 change Change change change change 
      
 -13.71 -5.27 -17.77 -20.84 -2.70 
pp … percentage points 
BEATRs are surely better indicators of the tax burden faced by MNCs than Statutory 
tax rates. Yet, if their variability is the same as those of the Statutory tax rates one 
could also use the latter in an econometric specification. This, however, need not be 
the case - notably for host countries with relative ly stable Statutory corporate tax 
rates. For a particular country pair Austria – Slovenia, table 8 shows that the 
variability of the BEATR is much higher than those of the Statutory tax rate (which in 
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this extreme case is zero)22. This is because BEATRs cover all important tax codes 
and hence include more potential sources of variability than the DEATRs and 
Statutory tax rates. For the bilateral relationship Austria  - Slovenia  the main sources 
of variability are the adoption of the double taxation agreement which entered into 
force 1999, the changes in allowances in Austria from 2001 and in Slovenia from 
2003 onwards as well as the adoption of the parent-subsidiary directive in 2004 by 
Slovenia. It is important to note that the calculated variability is high despite both 
countries have constant Statutory tax rates during the sample period. Also note that 
one may find several other country pairs with quite different STDs in the BEATRs and 
the Statutory corporate tax rates (e.g. Germany-Slovenia (2.98 pp vs. 0.0 pp); 
Austria-Hungary (3.02 pp vs. 0.65 pp), Italy-Hungary (3.10 pp vs. 0.65 pp)).23 
 
Table 8 Standard Deviations II (1996 – 2004)  
 BEATR AUT -SI SI Statutory tax rate 
Year % % 
2004 18.28 25.00 
2003 21.77 25.00 
2002 18.85 25.00 
2001 18.85 25.00 
2000 18.85 25.00 
1999 18.85 25.00 
1998 26.12 25.00 
1997 26.12 25.00 
1996 26.12 25.00 
 Percentage points Percentage points 
STD 3.58 0.00 
 
 
 
4 Summary and Further Steps 
 
The purpose of this paper was to discuss the appropriateness of measures of tax 
burden as a factor explaining the location decisions of MNCs. First, on the basis of a 
survey of six empirical studies a median value of the tax-rate elasticities of FDI in 
CEE-NMS and mediterranean periphery countries was derived. Second, building on 
our criticism of FDI as a measure reflecting multinational activity and the Statutory tax 
                                              
22 In the case of the DEATRs both the Statutory tax rate and DEATR series had no or a very low 
variability. 
23 Using the Levene-Test again we reject the hypotheses of equal variances for several country pairs 
(e.g. AUT-Sl, GER-SI, US-SK). 
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rate as a measure of tax burden, BEATRs following Devereux and Griffith (1998) for 
seven home and five host countries were calculated.  
 
Our analysis shows: 
1. ETRs are warranted as a rough measure of the tax burden levied upon capital, 
whereas the Statutory tax rate may be very misleading. 
2. EABTRs are much better indicators than DEATRs or Statutory tax rates to 
assess the tax burden on FDI. 
3. Empirical estimates of tax-rate elasticities  should be based on bilateral rates, 
which usually have a d ifferent variability than Statutory tax rates . This is in 
marked contrast to authors (e.g. Javorcik 2004) who argue that the differences 
between the Statutory tax rates and EATRs are negligible. However, such a 
comparison is flawed, since the host country’s Statutory tax rate must not be 
compared to the host country’s domestic EATR, but to the host country’s 
BEATRs. 
4. Using BEATRs as a tax indicator instead will prevent a bias resulting from a 
“measurement error”. 
5. Economic theory should be used to select the other right-hand-variables in  
order to prevent an omitted variable bias. Our reading of the literature and the 
empirical evidence that has been produced so far is that one has to include a 
large number of factors which may affect FDI besides taxes (e.g., Bernard et 
al. 2004; Bevan et al. 2004; Mudambi, 2002). These factors include firm 
characteristics as well as home and host country characteristics, defined in 
relative terms on a bilateral level. The selection of these explanatory and 
control variables should be guided e.g., by the OLI-paradigm. 
6. As no study has used BEATRs for calculating tax-rate elasticities  of FDI in the 
CEE-NMS so far one should to be very cautious in interpreting the available 
elastic ities (magnitude and sign). Two relevant policy implications24 may be 
                                              
24 Since the tax elasticities have been derived under the ceteris paribus  condition, a caveat seems to 
be in order here: (a) If despite the tax rate has been lowered, FDI does not react, this could be a sign 
of a high share of market-oriented FDI or that the tax burden accounts only for a small share in total 
costs concerning efficiency-oriented FDI. (b) If, despite the tax rate has been increased, FDI does not 
react this could be interpreted as MNCs engaging in transfer-pricing and like activities. 
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derived from the of the tax-rate elasticity, if a causal relationship exists 
between location choice and tax rate::  
§ If tax-rate elasticities wrt FDI are low, lowering corporate tax rates leads to a 
loss of tax revenues, without increasing the amount of inward FDI.  
§ If tax-rate elasticities wrt FDI are high, then either the “Leviathan” view (i.e. 
overprovision of public goods) or the traditional view (i.e. underprovision of 
public goods) may be taken. In the first case, tax competition will be viewed 
favourably, in the second case, tax coordination or even harmonization will be 
preferred. 
 
Finally it should be mentioned that the results on ETRs derived on a bilateral level for 
a number of home and host countries are grossly in line with results reported in other 
studies (e.g. Yoo, 2003; Jacobs et al. 2003). Yet, the particular time range and the  
selection of the countries clearly make the derived BEATRs a unique basis for further 
analysis of location-choice of MNCs in CEE-NMS. 
 
5  References 
 
Alfano M.R. (2004) Government policy and inward FDI flows within transition 
countries: a TSCS analysis , Paper presented at IIPF, Milano, pp. 1-22. 
Altzinger, W. (1998) Austria's foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe: "supply based" or "market driven? Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Vienna, 
mimeo. 
Altzinger, W. (2003) Returns on Equity of Austrian Affiliates in Central and Eastern 
Europe, unpublished paper prepared fort he Conference on „EU Enlargement and 
Social Cohesion“, Budapest, 7-9 March 2003. 
Antalóczy K., Sass M. (2001), Greenfield investments in Hungary: Are they different 
from privatization FDI? Transnational Corporations, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 39-60. 
BEA (2004) A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies , Web 
download (18.10.). 
Beaulieu E., Mckenzie K.J., Wen J.-F. (2004) Do taxes matter for firm location? 
Paper presented at IIPF, Mailand, pp. 1-29. 
 27
Bellak, C. (1998) The Measurement of Foreign Direct Investment – A Critical Review, 
International Trade Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 227-257. 
Bellak, C. (1999) Kritische Einschätzung der Erfassung und Verwendung von 
Direktinvestitionsdaten, in Döhrn, R. and G. Heiduk (eds.) Theorie und Empirie 
der Direktinvestitionen, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, pp. 103-128. 
Bellak, C. and J. Cantwell, Revaluing the Capital Stock of International Production, 
International Business Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1 -18.  
Benassy-Quere A., Fontagne L., Lahreche-Revil A. (2003) Tax competition and 
foreign direct investment. CEPII Working Paper, No. 2003-17, December. 
Bernard A., Redding S., Schott P., Simpson H. (2004) Relative wage variation and 
industry location. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 4213. 
Bevan A., Estrin S., Meyer K. (2004) Foreign investment location and institutional 
development in transition economies. International Business Review, Vol. 13, pp. 
43-64. 
Beyer, J. (2002a) Wie erfolgreich sind Maßnahmen zur Förderung von ausländischen 
Direktinvestitionen? Empirische Befunde aus den Transformationsländern, 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik , 51 / 1, pp. 63-83. 
Beyer, J. (2002b) Please Invest in Our Country. How Successful were the Tax 
Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Countries? in: Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, 35 / 2, pp. 191-211. 
Bucovetsky S., Wilson J.D. (1991), Tax competition with Two Tax Instruments, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21, pp. 333-350. 
Büttner, T. (2001) Empirie des Steuerwettbewerbs: Zum Stand der Forschung. In: 
Regeln für den europäischen Wettbewerb: Steuern und soziale 
Sicherungssystem (W. Müller, Ed.), Metropolis, pp. 53-70. 
Carey, D. and J. Rabesona (2004) Tax Ratios on Labor and Capital Income and on 
Consumption, in: Sorensen, P.B. (ed.) Measuring the Tax Burden on Capital and 
Labor, CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 213-262. 
Cantwell, J.A. and C. Bellak, How important is foreign direct investment? Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 60, 1998, pp. 99-106. 
Carstensen, K. and Toubal, F. (2004) Foreign direct investment in Central and 
Eastern European Countries: a dynamic panel analysis, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 32, 2004, pp. 3 -22. 
 28
Dell’mour, R. (2003) Direktinvestitionen Österreichs – Ergebnisse der Befragung 
2001 und Entwicklung ausgewählter Indikatoren, Berichte und Studien, OeNB, Nr. 
4, pp. 73-87. 
DeMooij, R.A., Ederveen, S. (2001) Taxation and foreign direct investment: a 
synthesis of empirical research, Paper presented at the OCFEB Conference, 
October, The Hague, pp. 1-40. 
DeMooij, R.A., Ederveen, S. (2003) Taxation and foreign direct investment: a 
synthesis of empirical research, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 
673-693. 
Desai, M.A., Foley, C.F., Hines, J.R. Jr. (2003) Chains of ownership, regional tax 
competition, and foreign direct investment, in: Herrmann, H., Lipsey, R. (eds.) 
Foreign direct investment in the real and financial sector of industrial countries, 
Springer-Verlag, pp. 61-98. 
Desai, M.A., Foley, C.F., Hines, J.R. Jr. (2004) Foreign direct investment in a world of 
multiple taxes, Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 88, pp. 2727-2744. 
Devereux, M.P. (2003) Measuring taxes on income from capital. CESifo Working 
Paper No. 962, pp. 1 -35; published in: Sorensen (ed; 2004), pp. 35-71.  
Devereux, M.P., Griffith R. (1998) Taxes and the location of production: evidence 
from a panel of US multinationals. Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 68, pp. 335-
367. 
Devereux, M.P., Griffith R. (1999) The taxation of discrete investment choices, IFS 
Working Paper Series No. W98/16, pp. 1-46. 
Devereux, M.P., Griffith R. (2002) The impact of corporate taxation on the location of 
capital: a review. Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 79-102. 
Devereux, M.P., Klemm A. (2003) Measuring taxes on income from capital: evidence 
from the UK. CESifo Working Paper No. 968, pp. 1-26; published in Sorensen 
(ed; 2004), pp. 73-98. 
Devereux, M., Lockwood, B. and Redoano, M. (2002) Do Countries Compete over 
Corporate Tax Rates? CEPR Discussion Paper Series, Public Policy, No. 3400, 
May.  
Dobrinsky R. (2003) Tax structures in transition economies in a comparative 
perspective with EU member states. In: Structural challenges for Europe, G. 
Tumpel-Gugerell, P. Mooslechner (eds.), Edward Elgar, pp. 298-328. 
Eckstein P. P. (2000) Angewandte Statistik mit SPSS, Gabler, Wiesbaden. 
 29
Edmiston K., Mudd, S. and Valev, N. (2003) Tax Structure and FDI: The deterrent 
effects of Complexity and Uncertainty, Fiscal Studies , 24, pp. 341-359. 
Ekholm K. (2002) Comment on Michael P. Devereux and Rachel Griffith: The impact 
of corporate taxation on the location of capital: a review. Swedish Economic 
Policy Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 103-105. 
Eurostat (2003) Foreign Direct Investment Compilation Guide, Statistical Office of the 
European Communities, February. 
Feld L.P. and Kirchgässner G. (2001) Vor- und Nachteile des internationalen 
Steuerwettbewerbs. In: Regeln für den europäischen Wettbewerb: Steuern und 
soziale Sicherungssystem (W. Müller, Ed.), Metropolis, pp. 21-52. 
Gordon, R., L.Kalambokidis and J. Slemrod (2003) Do we now collect any tax 
revenue from taxing capital income? Journal of Public Economics, 88, pp. 981-
1009. 
Gorter J. and Parikh, A. (2003) How sensitive is FDI to differences in corporate 
income taxation within the EU, De Economist 151, No. 2, pp.193-204. 
Grubert H. and Mutti J. (2000) Do taxes influence where U.S. corporations invest? 
National Tax Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4, Part 1, pp. 825-839. 
Hall R.E. and Jorgenson D.W. (1967) Tax policy and investment behavior. The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 57, pp. 391-414. 
Hansson, A. and Olofsdotter K. (2004) Integration and tax competition: an empirical 
study for OECD countries. Paper presented at IIPF, Milano, pp. 1-31. 
Hartman D.G. (1985) Tax policy and foreign direct investment. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 107-121. 
Haufler A. and Stöwhase S. (2003) Taxes as a determinant for foreign direct 
investment in Europe. CESifo DICE Report, No. 2, pp. 45-51. 
Hines J.R. Jr. (1996a) Altered states: taxes and the location of foreign direct 
investment in America. The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 5, pp. 1076-
1094. 
Hines J.R. Jr. (1996b) Tax policy and the activities of multinational corporations. 
NBER Working Paper Series, No. 5589, pp. 1-53. 
Hines J.R. Jr. (1999) Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation. 
National Tax Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 305-322. 
Hungarian National Bank (2004) Recorded reinvested earnings in balance of 
payments statistics  (web download). 
 30
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (ed., various years) European Tax 
Handbook. 
Jacobs O.H., Spengel C., Finkenzeller M., Roche M. (2003) Company taxation in the 
new EU member states. Ernst & Young and ZEW, 54 p. 
Janicki H.P., Wunnava P.V. (2004) Determinants of foreign direct investment: 
empirical evidence from EU accession candidates. Applied Economics, Vol. 36, 
pp. 505-509. 
Jarras, L. and Obermair, G.,M. (2000) Structures of the Tax Systems in Estonia, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, Final Report for the 
Commission of the EC, DG XXI, Wiesbaden.  
Javorcik, B . S. (2003) The composition of foreign direct investment and protection of 
intellectual property rights: Evidence from transition economies, European 
Economic Review, 48, pp. 39-62. 
King, M. A. and Fullerton, D. (1984) The Taxation of Income from Capital, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
KPMG (ed., various years) Corporate Tax rate Surveys, web download. 
Krogstrup, S (2003) Are Capital Taxes Racing to the Bottom in the European Union? 
HEI Working Paper No. 01/2003. 
Lankes H.P., Venables A. (1996), Foreign direct investment in economic transition: 
the changing pattern of investment, Economics of Transition, Vol.4 No.2, pp. 331-
348. 
Lankes H.P., Wes M. (2001), FDI in economies in transition: mergers and 
acquisitions versus greenfield investment, Transnational Corporations , Vol. 10 
No. 3, pp.113-130. 
Leibrecht, M. and Römisch, R. (2002) Comparison of tax burdens. WIIW Research 
Report No. 292, 80p. 
Mendoza, E. G. Razin, A., Tesar L. L. (1994), Effective tax rates in macro-
economics, Cross -country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and 
consumption, in: Journal of Monetary Economics 34, p. 297-323. 
Mintz J.M. and Tsiopoulos T. (1994) The effectiveness of corporate tax incentives for 
foreign investment in the presence of tax crediting. Journal of Public Economics, 
Vol. 55, pp. 233-255. 
Mintz, J.M., Tsiopoulos, T. (1997) Taxation of foreign capital in the mediterranean 
region. Transnational Corporations , Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 51-94. 
 31
Morisset, J., Pirnia, N. (2000) How tax policy and incentives affect foreign direct 
investment. In: B. Bora (ed.) New directions for research in FDI, Routledge.  
Mudambi, R. (2002) The location decision of the multinational enterprise, in: P. 
McCann (ed.), Industrial location economics , Edward Elgar, pp. 263-285. 
Mutti, J.H. (2003) Foreign direct investment and tax competition. Institute for 
International Economics, 118p. 
Mutti, J. and Grubert H. (2004) Empirical asymmetries in foreign direct investment 
and taxation. Journal of International Economics , Vol. 62, pp. 337-358. 
Nicodeme, G. (2001) Computing effective corporate tax rates: comparisons and 
results, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Paper 
No. 153. 
OECD (1991) Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International 
Issues, Paris. 
OECD (2000) Tax Burdens – Alternative Measures, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No. 2, 
Paris. 
Sedmihradsky M., Klazar S. (n.Y.) Tax competition for FDI in Central-European 
countries, mimeo, 8p. 
Sorensen, P.B. (2004) Measuring the Tax Burden on Capital and Labor, CESifo, The 
MIT Press. 
Szanyi, M (1999), The role of FDI in restructuring and modernization: an overview of 
literature, in. Hunya G. (ed), Integration Through Foreign Direct Investment, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 50-80. 
Volkerink, B. and J. de Haan (2002) Tax ratios in macroeconomics: Do taxes really 
matter? Empirica, 29, 209-224. 
Wilson J., D. (1999), Theories of Tax Competition, National Tax Journal, Forum on 
Mobility and Tax Analysis Vol. LII, No. 2, pp. 269-304. 
Yoo K.-Y. (2003) Corporate taxation of foreign direct investment income 1991-2001, 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 365, 47p. 
Zemplinerová A., Jarolím A. (2001), Modes of FDI entry and firm performance: the 
Czech case, Transnational Corporations, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 95-112. 
Zodrow, G.R.  (2003) Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 
International Tax and Public Finance, 10, pp. 651-671. 
 32
 
6 Data sources 
 
o The main source for tax data is the European Tax Handbook (various years) 
of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation; KPMG’s Corporate Tax 
rate Surveys (various years); and Yoo (2003). 
o Information about the asset structure in the CEE-NMS is taken from the 
Vienna Institute of International Comparative Studies’ database. 
 
 
7 Appendix: Impact of the pre-tax financial return upon 
the bilateral effective average tax rate 
 
The calculation of forward looking ETRs using the Devereux-Griffith methodology 
requires several assumptions. One crucial assumption is the value of the fixed pre-
tax financial return (p). Devereux and Griffith (1998) show that in the absence of 
personal taxes on interest income and capital gains the BEATR approaches an 
adjusted Statutory tax rate with increasing p (p. 29f). Moreover they show that the 
BEATR increases with p if the bilateral EMTR is below the adjusted Statutory tax rate 
and decreases in the other case. The adjusted Statutory tax rate is thereby defined 
as25: 
 
)1(*_ Statutoryhost
Statutory
host
adjusted tdivtaxtt -+=  
 
As an example the impact of changes in p upon the BEATR of FDI from Austria to 
Slovenia  for the year 2003 is demonstrated. In 2003 the host country Statutory tax 
rate was  25 percent and the tax on repatriated dividends (tax_div) was 5 percent. 
Therefore the adjusted Statutory tax rate is 28.75 percent. As the BEMTR lies below 
this value,26 the BEATR should increase with p. 
                                              
25 We additionally assume that their discrimination parameter between new equity and retained 
earnings is one . This is possible as we are excluding the personal sphere of the shareholder (see Yoo 
2003). 
26 Due to the very generous allowances for investments in machinery in Slovenia this rate is very low . 
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Table 9 Effect of increasing p on BEATR 
p EATR p EATR 
% % % % 
5 0.84 80 27.01 
10 14.79 90 27.20 
20 21.77 100 27.35 
30 24.10 1000 28.61 
40 25.26 10000 28.73604 
50 25.96 100000 28.74860 
60 26.42 1000000 28.74986 
70 26.76 10000000  28.74998 
 
Table 9 shows that the BEATR indeed approaches the adjusted Statutory tax rate  
with increases in p. 
